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Beyond the Board: Orbital High Ground—Why Space Superiority Is Slipping Away

“The next war might be won—or lost—22,000 miles above Earth.”

That’s not science fiction. It’s the stark reality defense planners are beginning to confront as space transitions from a support domain to a full-spectrum warfighting environment. For decades, the United States held an uncontested advantage in space, relying on exquisite, few, and highly capable systems to enable precision warfare, real-time intelligence, and global communications. Today, that edge is under siege.

Adversaries like China and Russia are investing heavily in space denial capabilities—from ground-based lasers and jammers to co-orbital anti-satellite weapons. Meanwhile, the U.S. military is still adapting to a landscape where resilience, redundancy, and rapid deployment matter more than technical elegance. If the U.S. cannot adapt fast enough, its long-held orbital superiority may become its greatest vulnerability.

From Strategic Advantage to Strategic Liability
Space was once a sanctuary—a quiet, strategic perch where U.S. dominance provided unmatched battlefield awareness. Systems like GPS, SBIRS, and WGS satellites helped revolutionize American warfighting doctrine, underpinning the precision strikes that defined Desert Storm and the counterinsurgency operations that followed.

But this model has aged poorly. Relying on a handful of high-value satellites created a “target-rich environment” for adversaries. A single missile or kinetic interceptor can now blind an entire ISR constellation or disrupt transcontinental command-and-control. In a future conflict, the first shots may not be fired on land, sea, or air but in space.

China, Russia, and the New Space Threat Landscape
The most visible shift in the space security dynamic began with China’s 2007 kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) test. By destroying a defunct weather satellite, China not only generated thousands of pieces of debris but also sent a message: American satellites are not untouchable.

Since then, China’s space capabilities have grown exponentially. The People’s Liberation Army views space dominance as a prerequisite for achieving “informational warfare.” This includes jamming GPS, spoofing satellite feeds, and deploying dual-use platforms that blur the line between civilian and military intent. China’s BeiDou system, for example, is both a navigation aid and a resilient alternative to GPS.

Russia, too, has made alarming strides. Its electronic warfare systems have jammed satellite communications in Eastern Europe. Even more concerning, its suspected “nesting doll” satellites—equipped to maneuver near and possibly damage other spacecraft—have raised alarms at U.S. Space Command. Russia’s military doctrine openly describes space as a domain for preemptive disruption of enemy capabilities.

Beyond these major powers, countries like Iran and North Korea are making strides in space launch technology and cyber capabilities, while non-state actors could one day target vulnerable ground stations or exploit commercial satellites.

The U.S. Response: A Shift Toward Resilience
Recognizing the fragility of its current architecture, the United States has begun a pivot. The creation of the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command signaled a doctrinal shift. But it’s the Space Development Agency (SDA) that’s truly changing how America builds for space.

Instead of betting on a few large, high-cost assets, the SDA is fielding proliferated constellations: dozens, even hundreds, of smaller, lower-cost satellites in low and medium Earth orbits. These networks are designed for redundancy, quick refresh rates, and contested operations. The National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA), for example, includes layers for tracking hypersonic assets, enabling communications, and maintaining command and control during a kinetic attack.

Yet challenges persist. Acquisition timelines remain sluggish compared to commercial counterparts. Budget volatility disrupts long-term planning. And the Defense Industrial Base—especially in satellite bus manufacturing, space-qualified components, and PCB fabrication—remains shallow and overly consolidated.

The Commercial Conundrum: Help or Hazard?
One of the most dramatic developments in the new space race is the rise of commercial players. SpaceX, Amazon Kuiper, Planet, and others are reshaping global access to orbit. On one hand, they offer the Pentagon low-cost launch, rapid innovation, and scalable infrastructure. On the other, they introduce strategic ambiguity.

Ukraine’s use of Starlink is a prime example. SpaceX’s satellites provided critical communications during Russia’s invasion, so much so that Russia labeled the constellation a legitimate military target. What happens when a commercial satellite becomes a casualty of war? Who responds? Is it an act of war, or just collateral damage?

The dual-use dilemma—civilian infrastructure providing military advantage—creates new legal, strategic, and deterrence challenges that policymakers haven’t fully grappled with.

What Comes Next: Strategic Recommendations
If the United States intends to preserve its edge in space, it must think differently:

1. Accelerate acquisition. Pentagon timelines must align with the speed of technological change. Streamlined funding and contracting for LEO/MEO constellations is essential.
2. Harden infrastructure. Satellites must be built to survive jamming, directed energy, and cyber intrusion. That includes encrypting links, dispersing ground stations, and eliminating single points of failure.
3. Define thresholds. A formal deterrence doctrine for space is overdue. What actions warrant a kinetic response? What constitutes a red line? Clear policy is vital for maintaining strategic stability.
4. Build alliances. Space is global. Sharing sensor data, building coalition constellations, and engaging in joint deterrence with NATO, Five Eyes, and Indo-Pacific partners is key.
5. Invest in situational awareness. The ability to track, catalog, and attribute hostile behavior in orbit is critical. Space debris, proximity ops, and spoofing need persistent monitoring.
6. Revitalize the Defense Industrial Base, starting with PCB manufacturing. Behind every satellite, radar, and guidance system is a network of printed circuit boards (PCBs), and the domestic supply chain for these critical components is shrinking. The U.S., by most estimates, has fewer than 140 PCB fabricators, down from over 2,000 in the 1990s. With far fewer having the equipment sets, certifications, or technical capability to support space PCBs. This erosion creates serious vulnerabilities in defense systems, especially those deployed in space. Revitalization will require a blend of tax incentives, purchase guarantees, and direct investment to modernize facilities, secure rare earth inputs, and re-shore advanced fabrication capabilities. No mission-critical system reaches orbit without a functioning, secure PCB backbone.

Conclusion: Hold the High Ground—Or Lose It

Space is no longer a quiet backdrop to terrestrial conflict. It is the new high ground—and it is contested. If the United States clings to legacy architectures and procurement timelines, it will cede this domain to adversaries who are moving faster and taking bigger risks.

The challenge is clear: build smaller, faster, and smarter. Partner with industry. Clarify doctrine. And above all, act with urgency. Because in the race for orbital dominance, second place is not an option.

Jesse Vaughan is a senior account manager at Summit Interconnect.